A 15-minute guide for partners and security leaders
ITDetect. Respond.
70% detection & response
One-way evidence←
OTPrevent. Isolate.
70% prevention
One view of the threat. Different rules for action.
01 / The operating model
One SOC. Two different responsibilities.
A security operations center (SOC) is the team, technology and operating process that turns security signals into decisions. It collects evidence, investigates what matters, contains attacks and improves the defenses for next time. Buying a console is only the beginning: somebody must own every serious incident, including at three in the morning.
In information technology (IT), the priority is to protect identities, applications and data while the business keeps changing. In operational technology (OT), it is to preserve a safe physical process: generating power, treating water, moving trains or running a production line.
A shared picture of the attack. A response that fits the environment. Isolating a compromised office laptop can be sensible. Isolating an industrial controller without understanding its process dependencies can itself cause an incident.
Yellow Cube’s approach
One command center. Clear response boundaries.
IT
Detect quickly. Contain confidently. Invest in rapid detection and response, with automation limited to approved actions on endpoints, identities and business systems.
OT
Keep the threat outside. Prioritize isolation and prevention. Monitor passively and keep industrial response decisions with the people responsible for the plant.
SOC
Bring the evidence together. Connect IT and OT signals in one investigation, with named incident owners and a tested escalation plan.
Hover or tap a number to explore a stage.
IT attack chain
Recon
Getting in
Persistence
Lateral movementPossible pivot into OT →
Incident
Recovery ↻
OT attack chain
Recon
Lateral movement
Incident
DamageThe cycle can end here.
IT can recover and repeat. Physical damage in OT may be irreversible. A pivot requires a reachable entry point into OT.
Set up. Operate. Keep improving.
A SOC is a service you keep building.
Start with agreed ownership and response limits. Then repeat this cycle as your business, plant and threat landscape change.
One shared view. IT response. OT safety.
01
Connect new signals
Map assets, owners and critical processes. Connect approved EDR, NDR, identity and application feeds to Open XDR; stage new OT feeds until isolation is verified.
02
Secure and verify isolation
Build and test the one-way OT-to-IT monitoring path. Check for bypasses and approve each exported feed and offline import procedure before use; recheck after changes.
03
Collect evidence and investigate
Monitor feed health and missing logs. Correlate endpoint, network and identity evidence with asset criticality to investigate what is happening and prioritize incidents.
04
Decide, respond and restore
Contain IT threats using approved playbooks and verify recovery. Escalate OT actions to plant and safety owners using tested local procedures.
05
Learn, maintain and improve
Review incidents and exercises, tune detections, maintain sensors and connectors, and retest response and recovery. Feed coverage gaps and configuration changes into the next cycle.
↻
Every change starts another check. Review after new integrations, infrastructure changes and incidents, and at scheduled exercises. Use what you learn to improve coverage and verify isolation again. OT security guidance [6]
02 / Follow the consequences
The same budget. A different center of gravity.
Our starting point for allocating security effort in a mature environment. These are Yellow Cube planning recommendations, not industry averages or a procurement formula.
IT
Find it. Contain it. Recover.
30%prevention70%detection & response
Spend beyond the first line of defense: behavior, identity, network visibility, investigation and an effective response team.
OT
Keep the attack outside.
70%prevention30%detection & response
Put the weight on isolation, controlled transfers and safe engineering. Retain passive monitoring and a practiced response plan.
Apply this split after agreeing the scope. It does not mean abandoning identity controls, backups, training or safety engineering. Existing maturity, exposure and the consequences of failure determine the actual investment.
Why the balance changes between IT and OT
Decision
Business IT
Industrial OT
What must be protected?
Information, identities and service continuity.
People, equipment and the physical process.
Can we change the system?
Frequent updates and centrally managed endpoints are often feasible.
Changes depend on vendor support, testing and maintenance windows.
Can we reverse a response?
Many actions can be rolled back, although business disruption still matters.
A shutdown or lost control signal may have immediate physical consequences.
What does recovery restore?
Tested backups can restore systems; they cannot undo stolen information.
Backups can restore logic and configurations; they cannot repair damaged machinery.
82%
of CrowdStrike’s detections in 2025 were malware-free.
82% malware-free · 18% other detections. CrowdStrike 2026 Global Threat Report. This describes its observed detections, not the proportion of all attacks worldwide. [1]
That is a compelling reason to look beyond signatures. An attacker may sign in with stolen credentials, abuse a remote administration tool or use a legitimate shell to move through the environment. “Malware-free” is broader than “fileless”: it also includes activity that never needs a malicious program.
Living-off-the-land attacks turn tools administrators already trust into attack tools. The question becomes who used them, on which machine, with what privileges, and what happened next. Endpoint detection and response (EDR), network detection and response (NDR), identity events and cloud logs each reveal part of that story. Extended detection and response (XDR) connects those parts.
Build a dependable 30% foundation
10% Endpoint prevention
Signature-based antivirus is a baseline, strengthened by behavioral prevention, application controls and exploit protection. A prevention layer still matters even when it cannot see every attack.
10% Security posture
Remove unnecessary exposure, excessive permissions, weak identity settings and risky cloud configurations. Inventory and ownership turn findings into accountable work.
10% Vulnerability & patch management
Prioritize exploitable, exposed assets and business impact. Validate that the fix landed; a patch scheduled is not a vulnerability closed.
AI-assisted research adds pressure to that last category. In March 2026, Anthropic reported finding 22 Firefox vulnerabilities in two weeks with Mozilla. That is a concrete example of accelerated discovery, not proof that AI caused every increase in CVE counts. Our takeaway is practical: shorten the path from a relevant vulnerability to a verified fix. [2]
Make the other 70% operational
Running several competing real-time antivirus engines on every laptop is usually an impractical way to buy confidence: compatibility, performance and operations become the problem. A dedicated file-transfer scanner has a different workload and can combine multiple engines at a controlled checkpoint.
In IT, invest the remaining effort in seeing behavior, investigating incidents and acting fast. Approve reversible responses in advance, such as isolating a non-critical workstation or revoking a risky session. Protect privileged and service accounts with stricter rules. Test backup restoration and disaster recovery; neither should be assumed just because a backup job says “success.”
04 / An attack is a journey
Attackers are not born inside the OT network.
They need a way in, useful privileges and a way to influence the process. Each dependency is an opportunity to interrupt the attack.
01
Gain a foothold
A phished identity, exposed service or compromised supplier device provides initial access.
Watch: identity, email, endpoint
02
Prepare the route
The attacker discovers systems, collects credentials and looks for a bridge toward operations.
Watch: EDR, NDR, privileged access
03
Cross the boundary
A remote session, trusted transfer or maintenance device becomes the attempted entry path.
Prevent: isolation, transfer policy
04
Affect the process
Changes to logic, settings or operator visibility can turn a cyber incident into physical harm.
Protect: local safety and engineering
This is an illustrative path, not a promise of hours or days to respond. Some attackers move quickly. Others prepare for weeks. Detecting the IT foothold early can remove the access they intended to use before industrial systems are reached.
Interactive remote control needs a communication path. A correctly designed outward-only diode removes that return path. However, pre-positioned malware, insiders and compromised removable media can act without a live operator typing commands. Isolation and file prevention must work together.
An isolated IT foothold can cut off an attacker who depends on it. It does not prove that an already compromised OT environment is clean.
05 / The reference architecture
Unify the evidence. Keep the boundary.
Place the controls on a familiar Purdue map: EDR on IT endpoints, passive NDR in both networks, and one command center above the isolation boundary.
Endpoint and network evidence, correlated in one investigation.
EDRs on IT workstations and servers
IT NDR observations
OT NDR evidence through the diode
AI-assisted analysis & response
Automate approved IT actions. Escalate plant decisions to OT engineers.
L3.5
Hardware-enforced isolation
Monitoring data can leave OT. There is no return session or SOC control path into the plant.
One-way data diodeOT to IT only
OPSWAT or Waterfall Validated export / replication
Inside the protected OT zone
OT NDR sensor
Mirrored traffic only. The capture interface observes a copy from the OT switch or TAP.
Passive capture. No inline blocking. No active probing in this design.
Only approved monitoring evidence is exported through the diode above.
L3–L2
OT operations & control
Engineering workstation
HMI / SCADA
Historian
OT switch / TAP · mirrored copy to the OT NDR sensor
Production traffic stays on the OT network. The sensor receives a separate observation copy.
L1–L0
Controllers & physical process
PLCs / RTUs
Drives / field sensors
Machines / process
Local control and safety systems remain under plant authority.
A copy is visibility. A diode preserves isolation.
SPAN or TAP mirroring alone is not an IT/OT security boundary. The hardware-enforced one-way path prevents the SOC from sending traffic back through this monitoring connection.
Simplified Purdue placement; actual zones follow the site design. Between panels, solid connectors carry security evidence; dashed connectors identify mirrored traffic. OT sensing is passive, and only approved monitoring data crosses the diode. Validate the sensor/gateway pairing and provide local sensor updates. See Stellar Cyber’s deployment guidance [8].
What “airgap” means here
A literal air gap has no network connection. This design uses a hardware-enforced unidirectional boundary to preserve isolation while exporting data. It must not be confused with an ordinary firewall rule that can be changed to allow sessions back into OT.
Syslog can be collected inside OT and re-emitted outside it. FTP and other bidirectional protocols require compatible replication or proxy endpoints; a normal FTP session does not simply run through a one-way wire. Waterfall documents this approach for security monitoring, and OPSWAT offers optical diode and gateway options. [3][4]
Engineer the whole boundary
Choose the direction, protocols, volume and loss tolerance for each approved flow. Put a collector where it can operate without inbound cloud management, then validate buffering, time synchronization and sensor updates. Verify the selected product combination in a proof of concept.
Inventory every alternative path: vendor VPNs, dual-homed laptops, wireless links, cellular modems and shared administrative trust. A diode protects its own path; an overlooked connection can undermine the architecture. Separate sensor placement from the assumption that every sensor can operate across every diode.
OT gives us an opportunity that a roaming laptop rarely does: concentrate incoming files at a small number of controlled transfer points. Maintenance packages, configuration files and supplier media can be checked before they reach a protected engineering workstation.
OPSWAT MetaDefender Kiosk and Core support this prevention-led approach with multi-engine inspection and, for suitable formats, content disarm and reconstruction. The goal is deeper inspection at the boundary, with an auditable release decision. Scanning is not a guarantee; signed firmware and control programs still need authenticity checks and engineering validation. [5]
Identify. Record the supplier, intended asset, file type and business purpose.
Inspect. Apply the approved engine set, file policy and sanitization workflow. Quarantine failures or inconclusive results.
Approve. An authorized owner confirms that the content is appropriate, compatible and expected.
Transfer and verify. Release only the approved artifact, preserve the audit trail and validate its use in the planned maintenance window.
When patching is difficult, compensate deliberately
OT patching is constrained, not nonexistent. Some assets have long support cycles or narrow outage windows; others cannot accept an agent or an ordinary scan. Maintain an asset and vulnerability inventory, use vendor-approved updates when feasible, and document compensating controls when a fix must wait.
Passive monitoring remains valuable. Unexpected engineering activity, a new device or a changed communication pattern may reveal a problem before harm occurs. But detection after a dangerous control command may leave too little time to intervene. The architecture should prevent access to that command path before relying on a race to detect its misuse.
You can restore a controller configuration. You cannot restore a broken turbine from a backup. OT still needs tested backups, recovery procedures, spares and safe restart plans. They address recovery; they do not erase physical consequences. NIST explicitly treats reliability, safety and recovery as part of OT security. [6]
Controlled import / OPSWAT MetaDefender
One transfer point. Eight layers of inspection.
Build confidence before a file reaches OT. Each layer answers a different question about its source, contents or behavior.
Start with an untrusted supplier file or removable media
Identify the real file type, inspect supported archives and retain the original under quarantine while the required checks run.
Identify the geographic source of supported software from fingerprints and metadata. Route unknown or restricted provenance for review under the organization’s policy.
Correlate file reputation, known threat indicators and behavioral intelligence. Flag connections to malicious infrastructure, related malware or known campaigns.
Check supported executables, installers and libraries for known-vulnerable components and versions before installation. Keep avoidable CVEs out of the plant.
Combine leading anti-malware engines from vendors around the world. Broad signature coverage strengthens prevention against known threats, with complementary heuristics and other detection methods.
Examine structural and semantic file signals before execution to identify potentially malicious, previously unseen files. Add an early layer of zero-day protection.
Detect sensitive information, credentials and regulated content. Block or redact according to transfer policy; particularly valuable when files leave a protected environment.
Rebuild supported documents from approved content, removing risky active elements. Think of recreating a PDF from clean pages: a fresh, usable file, rather than trusting the original scripts and embedded objects.
HOLD / REJECT
A failed or incomplete check stops release.
Quarantine the file for investigation. Unknown results and policy exceptions need a decision from the responsible owner.
APPROVE / TRANSFER
Release the approved artifact through the offline process.
Use the reconstructed copy for supported documents. For patches and firmware, preserve the authentic vendor package; verify its signature, intended version and target, then test the expected fix before deployment.
A proposed inspection journey, not a fixed product execution order. Checks can run in parallel; file type, policy and licensed modules determine the workflow. CDR is for supported document formats, not a way to rebuild signed firmware. Threat intelligence informs patch review; engineering validation confirms whether the patch fixes the intended issue. No live IT-to-OT connection is created.
One investigation. The right specialists behind it.
Build around the customer’s assets and operating capability. Keep useful existing controls, close the gaps, and connect the evidence.
01 / Command center
Stellar Cyber Open XDR
Bring endpoint, identity, network, cloud and security-product evidence into a common investigation. AI-assisted enrichment, correlation and triage help analysts reduce noise and focus on meaningful incidents. Response automation follows approved playbooks and the permissions actually granted. [7]
02 / Visibility
NDR across IT and OT
Observe traffic where endpoint agents cannot go. Stellar Cyber’s OT guidance supports network sensors and industrial log sources in a shared analysis platform. Confirm protocol coverage and deployment constraints for the plant; “universal” means one investigation model, not identical visibility on every device. [8]
03 / People, around the clock
Cynet + CyOps
Cynet combines endpoint protection and detection with a 24×7 expert service. Choose the service tier and pre-approved containment authority that fit the customer. Its coverage applies to the agreed Cynet environment; it does not automatically operate every third-party tool connected to Stellar Cyber. [9]
04 / The industrial boundary
OPSWAT + Waterfall
Use MetaDefender for controlled file inspection and transfer workflows. Select an OPSWAT or Waterfall unidirectional solution for the approved data paths. These are complementary architecture roles; the exact combination, protocol support and maintenance process are validated with the partner.
Make the rest of the portfolio part of the story
A suspicious shell means more when it is connected to the email that preceded it, the identity it used and the data it accessed. Depending on the project, Yellow Cube can add these specialist capabilities. Connector availability and response permissions are verified individually.
Stop and expose the entry path
IronScales for email defense; Whalebone for DNS security; WithSecure or Cynet for endpoint protection; iVerify for mobile-device risk.
Control access and movement
Stormshield for network segmentation; Imprivata for privileged access; A10 Networks for DDoS and application/API protection.
Understand intent and impact
Group-IB for threat intelligence and external exposure; Varonis for data security; Teramind for insider-risk context. MailStore supports email archival, a distinct requirement from system backup.
Prove the operating capability
Cymulate for control validation; CYBER RANGES and Yellow Cube HackLab for practical exercises, investigation skills and rehearsed escalation.
AI can enrich an alert, connect related events, summarize an investigation and propose or execute a permitted response. It can also be wrong. Treat false-positive suppression as a tuned process with audit and review, not a promise that every closed alert was harmless.
Agree an action matrix before the first incident. Confidence, asset criticality and business context decide what runs automatically. Keep the evidence, the decision and the action together so an analyst can reconstruct what happened.
Automate by policy
Routine IT containment
Collect evidence, open a case, notify the owner and isolate an explicitly approved class of non-critical endpoint. Record the action and provide a recovery path.
Require approval
Actions with wider impact
Disable a privileged account, isolate a shared server or change network access only under the agreed escalation rules. A service account may power more than one business process.
OT authority remains local
Changes to the plant
Escalate to operations and safety personnel. Use validated local procedures for controller changes, process shutdowns and restart. An enterprise SOC playbook must not blindly trigger them.
An attacker may want the defender to overreact. A false alarm that causes a needless production stop can still achieve disruption. The answer is not to ignore OT alerts: it is to combine the SOC’s evidence with engineering authority and a safe decision process.
09 / From concept to an operating service
Start with one real site. Prove the complete workflow.
For partners, the commercial opportunity is an operating capability: design, integration, validation and continuous service around the customer’s existing investment.
01
Map the environment and consequences
Identify critical processes, IT dependencies, existing tools and every IT/OT connection. Agree which systems may be isolated and who owns each decision. The output is a scoped architecture, not a generic bill of materials.
02
Prove the data paths
Connect a representative set of IT sources and passive OT telemetry. Test parsing, timestamps, diode replication, buffering and collector health. Demonstrate that the monitoring path cannot become a control path.
03
Rehearse the response
Exercise an IT compromise, a rejected maintenance file and an OT anomaly. Confirm who receives the case out of hours, what they may do and how plant personnel are reached. Validate recovery as well as containment.
04
Operate, measure and improve
Track telemetry coverage, time to investigate, approved containment time, transfer exceptions and recovery exercise results. Review changed assets, new connections and expiring maintenance exceptions with the customer.
Bring us your network sketch and current security stack.
We can work with you on the boundary design, missing visibility, product fit and 24×7 operating model. Together, we can define a practical proof of concept and a service your team can confidently deliver.
01Do we need to replace our existing EDR or SIEM?+
Start with what works. Open XDR can bring supported data sources into one investigation. We validate connector coverage, retention, duplication and response permissions before recommending consolidation or replacement.
02Does strong isolation mean we can stop monitoring OT?+
No. Passive monitoring and local incident readiness remain essential for insider activity, maintenance mistakes, malicious imports and unexpected connections. Prevention reduces exposure; monitoring checks whether the assumptions still hold.
03Who owns an incident outside business hours?+
Agree this explicitly in the service design. Cynet CyOps covers the contracted Cynet scope. The partner, customer and any additional SOC provider must define ownership for other sources, escalation to plant staff and authority to act. A shared console does not replace a service agreement.
04Can we start with IT and add OT later?+
Yes. Establish the IT detection and response foundation, then add OT visibility through approved paths. Map industrial dependencies at the start so early IT automation cannot accidentally disrupt operations, and build the boundary before connecting the plant.
05What should we prove before a wider rollout?+
Start with one representative site and agree success criteria before selecting the final stack. Demonstrate useful IT and OT evidence in one investigation, reliable one-way telemetry, controlled file imports and a rehearsed response with named owners. Measure coverage, investigation time and transfer exceptions. The result should show what works, what needs engineering and what it will take to operate at scale.
06What determines the cost, and do we need the whole stack?+
Scope the service around the assets and risks you need to cover. Endpoint and site counts, telemetry volume and retention, OT sensors, gateways, file-inspection modules, integrations and service coverage all affect the proposal. Keep effective existing controls and add capabilities where there is a gap. Agree the implementation work, recurring licenses, support and operating responsibilities as separate parts of the commercial scope.
07Can we offer this as a managed service to our customers?+
Yes. Partners can build a service around assessment, integration, monitoring, controlled transfers and ongoing improvement. Yellow Cube can support architecture and product selection, technical validation and sales enablement. Define who operates each platform, who covers out-of-hours incidents and which actions require customer approval. Confirm vendor service scope and commercial terms for the chosen combination before making commitments to the customer.
08Can we add OT visibility without disrupting production?+
Plan for passive observation and staged deployment, with the plant team approving sensor placement, data export and maintenance windows. Validate the monitoring path and its dependencies before enabling a new feed, and agree acceptance and rollback criteria. Monitoring should not become an inline control dependency. Changes to plant equipment or network connections still require site-specific engineering approval.
09What needs maintaining after the SOC goes live?+
Assign owners for connectors, sensors, gateway replication, file-inspection policies and detection content. Monitor missing logs and collector health, schedule approved updates, review response permissions and rehearse escalation and recovery. Revalidate isolation when assets or connections change. Regular service reviews should track coverage, investigation times, transfer exceptions and actions completed, so the SOC keeps pace with the environment it protects.
10What should we bring to our first conversation?+
Bring a rough network sketch, your current security tools, the sites and assets in scope, and the known connections between IT and OT. Tell us who handles incidents, which production constraints matter and where coverage is missing. For partners, include the service you want to offer. We can use that starting point to shape a practical proof of concept and the next technical and commercial steps.
Let’s Build Smarter Cyber Defenses Together
Partnerships are the foundation of everything we do — built on trust, expertise, and shared success. Whether you’re looking to grow your business, strengthen your cybersecurity offerings, or bring innovative solutions to new markets, Yellow Cube is ready to be your committed, long-term ally.