The environment is intended to isolate specified code and data from other software and, under its threat model, from some highly privileged operators. This complements protections for data at rest and in transit rather than replacing them.
A confidential-computing design defines what enters the TEE, which components remain trusted, and how secrets are released. Remote attestation supplies evidence about an environment and its measured state for appraisal against policy; it should be tied to workload identity, freshness, software approval, key release, updates, and revocation.
Key points
Threat model and boundaryState which hardware, firmware, monitor, runtime, workload, administrators, and external services are trusted, and which host or cloud privileges the environment is expected to resist.
Attestation policyAuthenticate the evidence source, check freshness and approved measurements, retain appraisal rules, and decide what access or key release follows each result.
OperationsProtect images and build provenance, minimize the trusted computing base, patch platform components, control inputs and outputs, rotate secrets, and plan recovery when hardware or measurements change.
Important limitationIsolation and attestation do not prove that workload code is correct or safe. Side channels, implementation flaws, malicious inputs, exposed outputs, denial of service, compromised endpoints, and hardware or supply-chain weaknesses may remain; attestation is evidence evaluated under policy, not a guarantee.